



# Specifications for eSignature Interoperability across Europe

Jon Ølnes  
Difi (Agency for Public Management and eGovernment),  
Norway



# PEPPOL

<http://www.peppol.eu>

## The Project

# PEPPOL Starting Point

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**Overall, governments are the largest buyer in the European Union, but they are lagging behind major industries in electronic data exchange with suppliers.**

- ▶ Government purchases in the European Union account for around 16 % of GDP, which is equal to 1,500 Billion Euro.
- ▶ Overall capabilities of governments to handle key processes with their suppliers such as tenders, orders, delivery notes, catalogues, invoices, or payments is lagging behind other major industries.
- ▶ The lack of common standards for electronic data exchange is considered an obstacle for companies to participate without barriers in public procurement processes.

# Change Ahead

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**EU member states have expressed a political will to change public procurement significantly.**

The Manchester ministerial declaration of 24 November 2005 defines the target:

“By 2010 all public administrations across Europe will have the capability of carrying out 100 % of their procurement electronically and at least 50 % of public procurement above the EU public procurement threshold will be carried out electronically.”


# Vision

The broader vision is that any company (incl. SMEs) in the EU can communicate electronically with any EU governmental institution for all procurement processes.




# Strategy

National solutions will not be replaced, instead they will be aligned with common European standards and then linked through a common interoperability layer






# The Project




**Large-scale pilot under the CIP Programme**

**Parallel to STORK, epSOS, SPOCKS**

-  Present consortium (ongoing enlargement process)
-  Present reference group (some will become partners)
-  Regional Nodes

# Framework





# High level project plan

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- ▶ May 2008 – April 2009: Requirements and design
- ▶ May 2009 – April 2010: Implementation
- ▶ May 2010 – April 2011: Pilots running



# PEPPOL

## eSignature Interoperability

# The Public Procurement Directives

## Note: Cover tendering only



COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 13.12.2004

**COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE  
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL  
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS**

**Action plan for the implementation of the legal framework for electronic public  
procurement**

Qualified signatures  
not available in all  
member states and  
use limited in many  
member states.

Use of non-qualified  
signatures must be  
considered also for  
other reasons.

- ▶ *“Directives oblige any public purchaser in the EU to effectively recognize, receive and **process tenders submitted**, if required, **with a qualified signature and their accompanying certificates, regardless of their origin within the EU or their technical characteristics**”*
- ▶ *“The existing **significant differences between qualified signatures** .... should therefore be reason for great concern. **The interoperability problems detected despite the existence of standards .... pose a real and possibly persistent obstacle to cross-border e-procurement.**”*

# Other Directives - Requirements

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- Public Procurement Directives cover tendering only
- Service Directive requires e-signatures
- E-invoicing – e-signature primary mechanism
  - Can be avoided (“EDI Clause” of Directive) if other mechanisms are guaranteed to provide authenticity and integrity end to end
  - Can e-signatures be avoided in the PEPPOL case?
  - (Note: Directive has been revised.)
- Order process, catalogue etc. not covered by legal requirements for e-signature

# Paper-Based E-signature Paradigm

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- Qualified eID must be issued to a natural person
  - Only a person can produce a qualified signature
- But e-invoices are usually not signed in a user interface
  - Personal signature is a problem
- An e-signature binds to the name in the eID
  - Why does that name have to be a person name?
  - E.g. corporate signatures on e-invoices (person is not relevant)
  - What about automated orders/invoices between systems with no person involved?
- But we are largely stuck with personal signatures in Europe
  - Possible compromise: Inner, personal signature, outer corporate signature (e.g. invoice issuer)

# eID/eSignature Interoperability

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1. “Front-end” interoperability
  - U **Out of scope of PEPPOL – actors sign inside their** ept “any” card  
oi **own infrastructure. Leave this to STORK.**
2. “Back-end” interoperability
  - Receiver (relying party) shall be able to validate and accept signatures and eIDs from all relevant counterparts, no matter the eID issuer of the counterpart. Not “on-line”, rather asynchronous, message passing protocols.
3. Other parties: Verification of signed documents may (later) be required by parties not involved in the signing process

# PEPPOL Deliverable D1.1

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- **Requirements for Use of Signatures in Public Procurement Processes – 7 parts:**

1. Background and Scope
2. E-tendering Pilot Specifications
3. Signature Policies
4. Architecture and Trust Models
5. XKMS v2 Interface Specification
6. OASIS DSS Interface Specification
7. eID and e-Signature Quality Classification

<http://www.peppol.eu/deliverables/wp-1>

# PEPPOL Pilots

- E-procurement Processes:
  - Can be a single transaction
    - Like an invoice
  - Or a “long transaction”
    - Exchange of sets of messages according to some business protocol
  - Frequently asynchronous (message passing) protocols

- PEPPOL main scope
- CEN/BII Workshop

1. Automated, system to system
  - Information and protocol must be well-defined and executable
  - Typically XML documents (or EDIFACT, or ...)

2. Humanly controlled
  - Information intended for human inspection
  - Protocol (at least partly) controlled by human
  - Typically PDF documents (or Word/Excel, or ....)

- Tendering today (mostly)
- PEPPOL must test eSignatures even in this case due to Public Proc. Directives



# Signature Policies (1)

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- Commitment rules – binding of person names to, enterprises, roles and authorizations
  - Alternative 1: Accept signed documents (optimistic approach)
  - Alternative 2: Registration procedure to establish links
  - Alternative 3: Virtual Company Dossier (VCD) and attestations
  - Alternative 4: Employee eID (not available in general)
  - Alternative 5: Corporate eID (not acceptable in many countries)
  - Alternative 6: Inner personal + outer corporate signatures (requires solutions for issuing of corporate eIDs)
- VCD in PEPPOL is a structured set of certificates and attestations for the status of an enterprise, issued from existing registers

# Signature Policies (2)


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- Business protocols – what shall/should/can be signed in an eCommerce protocol?
  - Adding signatures to protocol specifications
  - Signing is (hardly) ever mandatory
    - Requirements may be determined by national legislation
    - Protocol specifications must support alternatives
  - Transparent, non-discriminatory selection of alternatives
    - If asked for, this document shall be signed at this stage of the protocol
    - Signature requirements that can be fulfilled by any actor
  - Technical specification of how to sign
    - Documents signed individually
    - Cover letter signed, attachments unsigned
    - Sign group of documents (e.g. a zip-file)
    - One + multiple signatures (sequential, parallel, countersignature)

# Signature Policies (3)

- Signature validation policy
  - Signature formats
    - Decision: Few requirements on sender, receiver must cope
    - Basic XML DSIG, XAdES BES (PDF, PKCS#7, CMS also allowed)
    - “Advanced XAdES/CAAdES” lack software support at present – not required from sender at this stage
  - Requirements for signature verification process
    - Requirements for certificate validation process (path validation etc.)
    - Quality requirements and approval status of eID (see part 7)
  - Interfaces and protocols: XKMS v2, OASIS DSS (see parts 5 and 6)
    - “Rich validation interfaces” to provide all information needed for signature acceptance (as opposed to merely verification)
  - Time stamps and TSAs (Time Stamp Authority)
    - No TSA requirement on sending side! Receiver may use TSA.
  - Logging, archival, records creation
    - Local matter to receiver – information must be available

# Federated Validation Services



# Validation Service vs Authority

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- Service: Process eIDs (and signatures), issue assertion, responsible only for its own actions
  - Assertions are validation responses
  - Refer to CAs (their policies and national laws) for liability
- Authority: Independent liability for validation assertion.
  - Assertions are authority statements
  - One trust anchor for the relying party
  - Uniform liability for all eIDs of same quality
  - From national law (of the CAs) to contract law

# XKMS v2 Interface

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- Profile of XKISS part of XKMS v2
  - Based on German profile
- eID validation interface
- Rich interface (more information) needed for validation
  - Merely validity (OCSP, CRL) is not enough to determine signature policy adherence
- Responses signed by “local” XKMS responder
  - If chained, responses are re-signed
  - CA signatures on OCSP/CRL but XKMS part signed separately

# OASIS DSS Interface

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- Profile of OASIS Digital Signature Services validation part
  - Based on DNV VA work (<http://va.dnv.com>)
- Signature verification interface
  - Whole signed document or pairs of signatures and hash values
  - Returns overall assertion on document and individual assertions on each signature and eID
  - Responses shall be signed by responder
- XKMS v2 interface used for chaining
  - Signatures processed locally, chaining of eID validation
- Gateway solution to remove content if needed
  - Install in customer network
  - Remove content, forward only signatures and hashes


# Part 7: Quality Classification (1)




- ▶ Qualified e-signature
  - Particular legal status according to EU e-Signature Directive
  - European term – what about e-signatures from outside of Europe?
  - Available in only (about) half of EU Member States
  - *6 states require this level today for public tendering (IDABC Preliminary Study on Mutual Recognition of eSignatures for eGovernment Applications)*
- ▶ Advanced e-signature
  - May have additional requirement for qualified eID
  - How can quality be assessed?
  - *7 states require this level today*
- ▶ Simple e-signature
  - Authenticate and submit
  - Logs ensure link between authentication, action, and documents
  - *2 states require this level today*
- ▶ PEPPOL: Policies defined as general rules
  - Today: Lists of accepted eID issuers – national only, few exceptions
  - Future: General quality requirements to eIDs and e-signatures
  - Requirements for (national) approval status



# Part 7: Quality Classification (2)



# Part 7: Quality Classification (3)



Approval status levels: 0-7

Note:  
 x=INTEGER(0,6)  
 defining the quality level of certificates as claimed by the CA through the Certificate Policy.

# Part 7: Quality Classification (4)



- Cryptographic Quality
  - Hash quality for signatures (note: controlled by signing software)
  - Public key algorithm and key length quality
  - **Quality 0:** Inadequate – should not be trusted
    - E.g. MD5 hash
  - **Quality 1:** Reasonably secure for 3 years
    - E.g. SHA-1 hash, RSA-1024
  - **Quality 2:** Regarded as trustworthy for 5-10 years
    - E.g. SHA-224, RSA-2048
  - **Quality 3-5:** Increasing levels of security
- Signature quality:
  - [{eID quality, approval status}, hash quality, public key quality]

# Validation Service vs Local

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- ▶ VS used to handle all eID issuers that are not handled locally
  - Tune this as desired from 100 % locally to 100 % by VS
- ▶ Pure add-on to existing solutions
  - Add a VS interface to handle all not handled locally
- ▶ VS may issue independent assertion (kind of notary service)
  - An advantage in some cases even for “local” eID issuers

# Conclusions

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- Public procurement is really B2B scenario
  - With public agency in “B” role
- Signatures required – validation and acceptance needed
  - Cryptographic validity
  - Signature policy adherence
    - Names -> organization, roles, authorizations
    - What must be signed?
    - Signature formats and verification rules
    - Quality and approval status requirements
  - Trust models for validation “proofs”
- Standardized interfaces
- Standardized scheme for quality classification

# Contact



Further information can be obtained from the regional contact points below and at <http://www.peppol.eu>

Denmark, Estonia,  
Finland, Ireland, Iceland, Ireland  
Lithuania, Latvia, Norway, Sweden,  
UK/Scotland  
please contact:  
**Mr. André HODDEVIK**  
**(Project Director)**  
Email: [andre.hoddevik@peppol.no](mailto:andre.hoddevik@peppol.no)

Austria, Czech Republic, France,  
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia,  
Switzerland and Western Balkan  
please contact:  
**Mr. Peter SONNTAGBAUER**  
**(Public Relation Director)**  
Email: [peter.sonntagbauer@brz.gv.at](mailto:peter.sonntagbauer@brz.gv.at)

Bulgaria, Cyprus, Italy, Greece, Malta,  
Portugal, Spain, Romania  
please contact:  
**Mr. Giancarlo DE STEFANO**  
Email: [giancarlo.destefano@tesoro.it](mailto:giancarlo.destefano@tesoro.it)

Belgium, Germany,  
Luxembourg, Netherlands  
please contact:  
**Ms. Maria A. WIMMER**  
Email: [wimmer@uni-koblenz.de](mailto:wimmer@uni-koblenz.de)